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Abstract
Throughout economic history, the global economy has experienced recurring crises. The persistent recurrence of such
economic crises calls for an understanding of their generic features rather than treating them as singular events. The global
economic system is a highly complex system and can best be viewed in terms of a network of interacting macroeconomic
agents. In this regard, from the perspective of collective network dynamics, here we explore how the topology of the global
macroeconomic network affects the patterns of spreading of economic crises. Using a simple toy model of crisis spreading,
we demonstrate that an individual country’s role in crisis spreading is not only dependent on its gross macroeconomic
capacities, but also on its local and global connectivity profile in the context of the world economic network. We find that
on one hand clustering of weak links at the regional scale can significantly aggravate the spread of crises, but on the other
hand the current network structure at the global scale harbors higher tolerance of extreme crises compared to more
‘‘globalized’’ random networks. These results suggest that there can be a potential hidden cost in the ongoing globalization
movement towards establishing less-constrained, trans-regional economic links between countries, by increasing
vulnerability of the global economic system to extreme crises.
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Introduction
Historic events, from the Great Depression and the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system to the more recent Asian financial crisis
and the current economic turmoil triggered by the United States
housing market, are only some of the dramatic episodes in the
chronicle of global economic crises [1]. Economic crises are
diverse in scale and detail, and recur intermittently yet persistently.
Researchers in political economy and international relations have
devoted this problem for many years [2]. The persistent
recurrence of economic crises despite great economic and political
efforts to prevent them suggests that they might be a generic rather
than singular part of the global economic dynamics [3,4], and
there might be a general pattern beyond episode-specific
particulars. Underlying this rationale is the idea that the global
economic system is a highly interlinked and interactive many-body
complex system comprised of heterogeneous entities (countries)
with intricate interdependencies [5]. Along this line, here we
address this problem in a quantitative setting using tools and
concepts from network science and viewing the global economic
crisis from the perspective of collective network dynamics [6–8].
From the spreading of infectious diseases [9] to political
opinions [10], the substrate structure over which pathogens or
opinions are transmitted plays a crucial role in determining the
large-scale pattern of spreading dynamics [8,11]. In the global
economic system, countries and other economic institutions are
connected through various economic channels ranging from
commodity and capital trading to political and administrative
partnerships. Changes in a country’s economic conditions can
spread through these connection channels in diverse ways, either
by directly inducing supply/demand imbalance and liquidity risk
or by indirectly affecting the comparative advantage and mutual
credit landscapes [12]. Accordingly, connectivity patterns of the
global economic system can impose structural constraints on the
dynamics of crisis spreading.
Network properties of the global economic system have been
documented in many studies, which have revealed scale-free
weighted topology at various levels [13–16], increasing connec-
tivity over time [17–20], and implications for economic develop-
ment [21,22]. However, much less is known about how such
structural properties could translate into or form constraints on
dynamic processes occurring in the global economic system,
especially with respect to crisis spreading. In this study we attempt
to fill this gap by establishing a general picture upon which more
specific and context-dependent situations can be studied and
understood.
Materials and Methods
The global macroeconomic network
Different connection channels in the global economic system,
such as commodity trading and administrative partnerships, may
possess distinct structural profiles and dynamic response charac-
teristics depending on various economic and political constraints.
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channel should be incorporated individually. It is, however,
neither possible nor necessary to do that in our study because our
main goal is to build a general picture and illustrate key features
that are less dependent on microscopic details, using the
philosophy of critical phenomena in statistical physics. Different
economic channels, despite their diversity, are not completely
independent of one another, as they are under a common
economic and political environment to some extent [23]. It has
long been argued that among the diverse channels the trading
relationships represent the most direct and consequential eco-
nomic interdependency between countries [24,25]. From a
practical viewpoint, international trading has been most compre-
hensively and transparently documented by official agencies for
many years. Therefore, we used international trade data to build
the global macroeconomic network (GMN) in this study.
The GDP data was obtained from the International Monetary
Fund World Economic Outlook Database October 2008 edition
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/
index.aspx). From the database, we used the five-year list of each
country’s GDP, from the year 2002 to 2006, except for 13
countries with limited data for various reasons. Whenever
possible, we used a five-year average value for the country’s
current representative GDP value (in US dollars). Otherwise, we
used the average value for the available period.
The trade data was obtained from the United Nations
International Merchandise Trade Statistics Publication Yearbook
2007 (http://comtrade.un.org/pb/CountryPages.aspx?y=2007).
This dataset contains for each country, among others, a list of
trading partners and corresponding trade volumes, both for
exports and imports, in the same five-year period from 2002 to
2006. As with the GDP, we used five-year average value for the
representative trade volume between two countries. Otherwise, we
used the average value for the available period.
In order to build GMN, we considered only countries with both
the GDP and trade data available in our datasets, resulting in 175
countries. The list of 175 countries with their characteristics
relevant to this study is tabulated in Table S1. In this way, we have
the GMN as a directed, node- and link-weighted network of 175
countries.
Crisis spreading model
From a theoretical perspective, the spread of an economic crisis
can be framed as a cascading failure or avalanche process [26–30].
Along this line, we introduce a toy model of crisis spreading on
GMN as follows (Figs. 1 and S1). Each node has its capacity Ci and
each link has the weight Wij (Fig. 1A). Suppose that a country i
collapses (Fig. 1B). As a result, the weights W of all links of country
i are decreased by a fraction f. If the total decrement DW of either
the incoming or outgoing link weights of any countries connected
to the collapsed country exceeds a fraction t of its node capacity C,
then these countries also collapse (for example, country k in
Fig. 1C), thereby decreasing their link weights by fraction f and
initiating an avalanche of collapses. This in turn can cause their
neighbors to collapse, and the avalanche proceeds until there are
no more newly-collapsed countries (Fig. 1D).
Key quantities in the resulting dynamics are the number of
subsequently collapsed countries starting from a given country’s
collapse (hereafter we call this avalanche size A of the country), and
the distribution of avalanche sizes P(A) over all starting nodes [31].
The avalanche size can be used to assess an individual country’s
potential impact as the crisis epicenter. The dynamics of the model
depends on the parameter ratio f/t. Depending on the value of the
reduced parameter f/t, the avalanche size distribution P(A) of all
countries takes a qualitatively different form. When f/t is too small,
there is no large avalanche, so P(A) decays rapidly with A. In
contrast, when f/t is too large, there is an excess of global
avalanches giving rise to a finite peak around the network-
spanning avalanche sizes. In between, there exists a critical point,
estimated to be f/t < 7, at which P(A) becomes power-law-like and
the system exhibits the broadest spectrum of avalanche outcomes
(Fig. 2). Due to lack of comprehensive records, there is currently
no clear empirical evidence of the power law in the magnitudes of
economic crises. However, many social and economic phenomena
are known to exhibit such a power-law pattern, such as the size of
wars measured by the number of casualties [32] and the
magnitude of short-term returns of stock market indices [33], as
well as some natural and technological phenomena such as the
magnitude of earthquakes [31] and the volume of Internet traffic
fluctuations [34]. From a methodological viewpoint, the dynamics
at the critical parameter provides additional advantage that the
avalanche sizes of countries disperse the most, thereby facilitating
the clearest comparison between countries. Therefore we focused
this study on avalanche dynamics at the critical point.
Results
The GDP of a country cannot fully account for its
avalanche size
One would expect that a country’s avalanche size would relate
to a macroeconomic index such as the gross domestic product
(GDP) [35]. Indeed, the avalanche size roughly scales with GDP,
especially for large GDP countries (Fig. 3). However, the GDP
cannot fully explain avalanche size. Specifically, the correlation
between them is significant but imperfect: the Spearman rank
correlation coefficient is 0.51 (P-value =1.07610
213, t-test). There
are outliers deviating from the overall trend. For example, Spain
has a small avalanche size (A=0) compared with its GDP (997
billion US dollars) whereas the Republic of South Africa (RSA) has
a much larger avalanche size (A=8) for its GDP (199 billion US
dollars).
To facilitate an understanding of the underlying mechanism for
these trends and deviations, we introduce the trade volume-GDP
profile (TGP) for a country, which is a scatter plot of trade volume
to each trading partner of the country with respect to the partner’s
GDP (Figs. 4 and S2). For example, the difference between the
TGP of Spain and that of RSA is obvious (Figs. 4A and B). Spain is
a good example of what we call a proportional trader, engaging in
more trades with high GDP countries and less trades with low
GDP countries. On the other hand, the RSA concentrates its trade
on low-GDP countries that have low capacities, and this brings
about the collapse of countries located far above the diagonal of
the TGP relation (black squares in Fig. 4B). From TGP analysis, it
can easily be seen that fluctuations in proportional trading in the
low GDP regions signify the degree of potential direct avalanche
impact of a country.
Cascade through weak channels entangles the crisis
spreading
A crisis spreads in cascades, not necessarily limited to direct
impact. For some countries such as France and Hong Kong
(Figs. 4C and D), collapsed countries are not only located above
the diagonal of the TGP but also in the middle of it, implying the
existence of the cascade process. Consider a cascade process with
the avalanche starting from Hong Kong as an illustrative example
(Fig. 5). The cascade process involves two operationally different
mechanisms. It can proceed directly by following successive direct
trade channels (via the solid arrows in Fig. 5), or indirectly by
Crisis Spreading in Global Macroeconomic Network
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cascade propagates through weak links, the weight of which is
insufficient to transmit the cascade directly. However, when the
impact through such a weak channel combines with impacts
through detours, the aggregate impact can be strong enough to
transmit the cascade. The weak links have been shown to play an
important structural role in financial market network [36]. The
fundamental unit of such an indirect cascade is a triad relation
with one strong link and two weak links (highlighted with black
arrows in Fig. 5). These indirect cascades render the avalanche
process nontrivial. Such entangled domino effects can also
establish invisible links, through which a crisis can spread even
to countries that are not directly connected to the initiation node.
For example, a crisis starting from Hong Kong can reach
Myanmar, which does not engage in a direct trade relation with
Hong Kong (Fig. 5; see Fig. S3 and Table S2 for more examples).
In this way, a country’s impact on crisis spreading is greatly
amplified by the local clustering of weak links, as exemplified by
the countries in the Southeast Asian block, similarly to the
accelerated spread of behavioral adoption through clustered social
networks [37].
Such a nontrivial cascade effect accounts for a significant
fraction of the avalanche for countries with relatively large
avalanche sizes. To assess this effect quantitatively, we divided a
full avalanche process into four sub-processes (Fig. 6): i) A one-step
direct avalanche comprised of countries that collapse by direct
impact from the starting country; ii) a multi-step direct avalanche
comprised of countries that collapse by direct cascade processes;
iii) an indirect avalanche comprised of countries that collapse
through indirect cascades; and iv) a residual avalanche comprised
of countries that collapse through impacts from countries in
indirect avalanche. For most countries with an avalanche size
A.10, the indirect avalanche constitutes more than half of the
total avalanche (Fig. 6). This clearly shows that crisis spreading
might not always propagate linearly and could occur in a highly
entangled way. Therefore, it is crucial to take the entire network
into account in order to fully understand the generic feature of the
crisis spreading process. Country-specific local connectivity
patterns can also affect an individual country’s avalanche profile.
For example, Russia shows a higher fraction of one-step direct
avalanches, most of which are former members of the Soviet
Union with low economic capacities. Hong Kong, Indonesia, and
Malaysia exhibit higher fractions of multi-step direct avalanches
that originate from their strong connectivity to Singapore.
The duration of an avalanche reveals additional aspects of the
entangled propagation of crisis spreading. The avalanche duration
of a country is defined as the number of cascade steps needed for
an avalanche process starting from the country to come to an end.
In general, larger avalanches tend to occur over longer durations,
and smaller ones tend to be shorter (Fig. 7). However, significant
Figure 1. Crisis spreading model. The dynamics of the crisis spreading model proceeds as follows: (A) Each node (country) is assigned a capacity
C given by its GDP value, and two countries i and j are connected by a directed link given by the trade relation with the associated weight Wij given
by the corresponding trade volume. (B) Suppose that a country i collapses (indicated as dark brown). Then the weights of all links of country i
(indicated as brown) are decreased by a fraction of f. And the total decrement DW of either the incoming or outgoing link weights of any countries
connected to the collapsed country is compared with the fraction t of its node capacity. (C) If the total decrement exceeds the threshold for any
countries, these countries also collapse (country k, in this example), triggering an avalanche of collapses. The link weights of newly-collapsed
countries are decreased by the fraction f, and total decrement DW of each country is re-evaluated. (D) This process continues until there are no more
newly-collapsed countries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g001
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RSA has a very short duration with respect to its avalanche size.
Its impact is entirely confined to its immediate South African
neighborhood and the avalanche proceeds for only two steps. In
contrast, countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore
have much longer durations of six steps compared to other
countries with similar avalanche sizes. This behavior is again
rooted in strong weak-channel clustering prevalent among these
Southeast Asian countries, which can support complicated
pathways with alternating direct and indirect cascades.
Large-scale patterns of crisis spreading
Characterizing the overall structural properties of the global
economic system is necessary to reveal the global-scale relation
between the network structure and the dynamics of crisis
spreading. To this end, we built a spanning tree for the GMN
comprised of maximum weight links [38]. As shown in the
spanning tree representation (Fig. 8A and Text S1), the global
economic system exhibits continental clustering, which has widely
been acknowledged in the literature [24,39]. In addition, we built
what we call the avalanche network, in which two countries are
connected by a directed link if a country can make the other
country collapse, resulting in 367 directed links connecting 175
countries (Fig. 8B; see Fig. S4 for a more detailed map with
annotations). In the avalanche network, 12 countries, such as
Bhutan and Solomon Islands, are isolated. These countries are
effectively economically isolated and engage in very limited trade
with the outside, so they neither cause other countries to collapse
nor collapse due to other countries. As expected, the overall aspect
of avalanche relations dictated by the avalanche network followed
the continental clustering structure of the GMN. To assess the
degree of continental clustering at the GMN and the avalanche
network structures, we calculated the fraction of links connecting
countries within the same continent (colored links in Fig. 8). In the
spanning tree of the GMN, 97 out of 174 links (56%) are intra-
continental links. In the avalanche network, 150 out of 367 links
(41%) are intra-continental links. As we will show, these fractions
are significantly high, quantitatively confirming the presence of
continental clustering. This continental clustering property
enabled us to build a coarse-grained avalanche network at the
continental level, revealing the major flow of influence and
dominance over different continental regions (Fig. S5). We note
that the large-scale pattern in the continental avalanche network
resembles the map of information flow based on the causal
relations between stock market indices described in [40],
indicating that both product exchange and information flow
between markets commonly reflect their economic interdepen-
dency.
Comparison with randomized network structures
To further investigate the effect of the network structure of the
global economic system on crisis spreading dynamics, we
introduced two randomized networks and studied their crisis
spreading characteristics against that of the GMN. First, we built a
globally-shuffled network (GSN) in the following way: i) Choose
two links randomly. ii) Consider swapping the trade partners of the
two links. iii) If the changes of both new links’ weights from the
original links’ weights in the GMN are less than 1%, accept the
exchange. Otherwise the exchange is not accepted and restored.
iv) Repeat i)-iii) until the stationary state was reached (see Text S1
and Fig. S6 for more details). An important point is to refer the
original link weight rather than the current weight for testing the
exchange acceptance criterion to prevent the accumulated
changes of link weights that may distort a country’s trading profile
undesirably. Using this randomization approach, we were able to
shuffle each country’s trading partners randomly while maintain-
ing the number of links and trade volumes of each link of each
country. This randomization has the effect of untangling the
continental clustering. Indeed, the spanning tree of the GSN
Figure 2. Avalanche size distributions. The cumulative counts of
countries with avalanche sizes equal to or greater than A, which
behaves in the same way as the cumulative distribution of P(A), is
plotted. At the critical parameter f/t=7, the plot becomes straight with
a slope of -1 (dashed line) on a logarithmic scale, indicating the power-
law relation P(A),A
22. The horizontal axis has been offset by one, to
plot the countries with A=0 on a logarithmic scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g002
Figure 3. Avalanche size vs. GDP. Scatter plot of the avalanche size
of each country offset by one (A+1) as a function of its GDP is displayed
with the color code by continental association (AF: Africa, EA: East Asia,
EE: East Europe, ME: Middle-East, NA: North America, SA: South America,
OC: Oceania, and WE: West Europe). The overall increasing trend with
some deviations indicates that the avalanche size of a country is partly
accounted for by the GDP, but not entirely. The dashed box indicates a
group of countries with A=0 (split to minimize overlaps to enhance
visual comprehensibility). Country name codes follow the ISO 3166-1
alpha-3 code throughout the paper.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g003
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deviation) intra-continental links (20%), a significant reduction in
continental clustering by more than one-half (empirical P-value
,10
23). The reduction of continental clustering was also found in
the avalanche network over the GSN (Fig. 8D), in which only
8063 out of 608618 links (13%) were intra-continental links;
again, a highly significant decrease by more than one-half
compared to the GMN (empirical P-value ,10
23).
The untangling of continental clustering in the GSN had the
significant effect of increasing the overall degree of crisis spreading.
In the GSN, the sum of avalanche sizes of all countries was
608618, significantly larger than the sum 356 in the GMN
(empirical P-value ,10
23). The origin of this enhanced crisis
spreading is that due to the untangling of continental clustering,
the failure of major countries could spread farther and more
broadly than in the GMN. Reflecting this, developed countries
such as the United States, Germany, Japan, China, and France
exhibited considerably larger avalanche sizes in the GSN than in
the GMN, which dominantly accounted for the increased sum of
overall avalanche sizes (Figs. 9A, 9B, and 10A). On the other
hand, many countries had their avalanche sizes reduced in the
GSN, such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, and some countries
completely lost their spreading ability, such as the RSA (Fig. 10A).
Most of avalanche size changes, both the increase and the
decrease, are accounted for by the indirect avalanche (Fig. S7).
This means that the nontrivial effect of the local connectivity
structure was almost disentangled in the randomized networks,
and the avalanche dynamics became simplified for most countries.
Only when the gross impact of a country exceeded a threshold did
crisis spreading through indirect avalanche occur and dominate.
In this sense, the rich-get-richer and the poor-get-poorer aspects
became more severe in the GSN.
Polarization of impact was further intensified in the second
version of our randomized network2the so-called globally-
Figure 4. Trade volume-GDP (TGP) profile. TGP of (A) Spain, (B) the RSA, (C) France, and (D) Hong Kong are displayed. Red points denote the
countries with lower GDPs than the starting country, and blue points in the gray area are those with higher GDPs. The black squares represent
countries that are collapsed by the starting country. The area shaded in orange denotes the region within which countries can be affected directly by
the starting country.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g004
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many trading partners as is constrained only by the total trade
volume. Specifically, we constructed a GDN in the following way:
i) Discretize and divide each trade link of GMN into unit links in
one million US dollars. ii) Start from the network with all the unit
in- and out-links unlinked. iii) Select one export unit and one
import unit from the unlinked unit links. iv) If the export and the
import countries are different, connect the two by an arrow.
Otherwise, discard the trial. v) Repeat iii)-iv) until all unit links are
connected. v) Merge unit links with same export and import
countries, restoring the weighted network structure. In the
hypothetical globalized world represented by a GDN, the
avalanche size distribution becomes even more polarized. In the
GDN, only three countries2United States, Germany, and
China2have dominant avalanche sizes (Fig. 9C). Yet, the average
avalanche size of these three countries is 132, spanning as much as
75% of the globe (Fig. 10B).
To quantify the degree of polarization in the avalanche impact
for different network structures, we calculated two quantities: the
typical size, and the likelihood of nonzero avalanches. The former
is given by the average of avalanche sizes over countries with
nonzero avalanche sizes and describes the expected global impact
that the global economic system might suffer once the avalanche
occurs. The latter is given by the number of countries with
nonzero avalanche sizes divided by the total number of countries,
providing a measure of how likely an avalanche is to occur when
crises are initiated randomly. Both randomized networks have a
higher typical size, 2061.8 for the GSN (empirical P-value ,10
23)
and 132611.0 for the GDN (empirical P-value ,10
23), compared
Figure 5. Full sequence of avalanche process starting from Hong Kong. Direct channels (solid arrows) and indirect channels (dashed arrows)
are distinguished because they contribute to the avalanche process by different mechanisms. Countries are colored according to the sub-process
they belong to, and their size is given by the GDP (in million US dollars). The starting country, Hong Kong, is colored in gray.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g005
Figure 6. Avalanche profiles. Bar plot showing the avalanche profile
of countries with the ten largest avalanche sizes is displayed. The total
avalanche process is divided into four sub-processes and the colored
bar denotes their distribution. For most countries shown in the figure,
the indirect avalanche (yellow) constitutes the largest fraction of the
total avalanche process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g006
Figure 7. Avalanche durations. Relation between avalanche
duration and avalanche size for 175 countries is displayed. Note that
some countries have much longer or shorter durations compared to
their avalanche sizes, thereby deviating from the overall increasing
trend. The same color code for the continental associations as in Fig. 3
are used.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g007
Crisis Spreading in Global Macroeconomic Network
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e18443to 9.7 for the GMN (Fig. 10B). The finding that spreading of crisis
becomes larger for random networks is consistent with the results
from a recent modeling study based on epidemic spreading [41].
On the other hand, they have a lower likelihood, 0.1860.015 for
the GSN (empirical P-value =0.007) and 0.01760.002 for GDN
(empirical P-value ,10
23), compared to 0.22 for the GMN. This
means that crisis spreading might take place less often in
randomized economic systems, but once it occurs, its impact
would be far more extensive and widespread than it is now in the
GMN. Underlying this robust-yet-fragile property is the dual role
of big countries: On one hand, they act as shock absorbers by
tolerating and buffering impacts from most countries’ collapse with
their large reservoir of economic capacities and alternative
connection channels [28]. At the same time, they are also the
Achilles’ heel [42] of the global economic system in the sense that
their failure would trigger the spreading of a worldwide crisis,
leading to an almost complete failure of the global economic
system. From the network topological perspective, the randomized
structures (the GSN and the GDN) possess elevated degrees of a
rich-club effect [43] compared to the GMN through the
disentanglement of continental clustering (Fig. S8). Such enhance-
ment of mutual linkage between large economies in the
randomized structures therefore may in part be responsible for
the changes in the crisis spreading property. This double-faceted
picture emerging from the crisis spreading dynamics of the global
economic system can be a starting point from which more
reasonable international relations development scenario based on
cascade control [44] and optimization for network resilience [45]
under crisis spreading can be formulated.
Robustness of the model results
The specific outcomes of avalanche dynamics may well depend
on the fine-scale structure of network linkages and the mechanistic
details of the crisis spreading process, modulated by episode-
specific environmental factors. Our toy model of crisis spreading
may have neglected many potentially important factors in crisis
spreading dynamics. Therefore, it is important to confirm the
robustness of the general features under economically reasonable
modification of the model’s details. Here we will present one such
modification of the model. Results of other modifications are
deferred to Supporting Information. Tolerance to crisis of a
country may be dependent also on the fiscal conditions of the
country that are not directly reflected in the GDP. For example
the current account balance (CAB) of the country may be a simple
indicator of its macroeconomic fiscal soundness. We incorporated
CAB to the model dynamics for investigating the robustness of the
main conclusions. To this end, we modified the economic capacity
of each country to be the sum of its GDP and CAB, such that
countries with positive (negative) CAB will tolerate the impact
from crisis to a larger (lesser) extent. We obtained the CAB data
from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook
Database, from which we also obtained the GDP data. Under
Figure 8. Global patterns of crisis spreading. (A) Spanning tree representation and (B) the avalanche network of the GMN are displayed
together with (C) the spanning tree and (D) the avalanche network of a typical sample of the GSN. The intra-continental links are colored according to
the color code of the continent and inter-continental links are colored in gray. A more detailed version of the avalanche network of (B) is available as
Fig. S4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g008
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dynamics is similar to that of the original model (Fig. 11): the
power-law-like avalanche size distribution is obtained around f/t
< 7 (Fig. 11A); the avalanche profile exhibits large portions of
indirect avalanches (Fig. 11B); and there are significant intra-
continental linkages, that is 146 out of 519 links (28%) in the
avalanche networks (Fig. 11C).
We have tried a number of other modifications, including link
and node weight rescaling, different cascading rules, and taking
other country-specific fiscal conditions into account (Text S1, Figs.
S9 and S10). Under all these modifications, we confirmed that the
overall patterns of the crisis spreading dynamics described in this
study remained unaltered. Furthermore, these overall patterns
were robustly and consistently obtained for a wide range of the
model parameter 3,f/t,20 (Text S1 and Figs. S11, S12, S13, and
S14). Therefore, the global pattern of crisis spreading dynamics
obtained in the study is likely robust and generic. There are still
missing components in our modeling; additions of other economic
channels, such as the financial links which are thought to be a
major origin of the current turmoil, would result in a better
episode-specfic explanation of the sequence of crisis spreading
dynamics. They are, however, not expected to alter the overall
avalanche properties qualitatively either, as long as they do not
completely change global network characteristics such as regional
and continental clustering. Therefore, even though the global
economic system will inevitably undergo structural and environ-
mental changes over time, we expect that the general framework
Figure 9. Comparison of avalanche sizes in different network
structures. Bar plots of avalanche sizes in decreasing order for (A)
GMN, (B) GSN, and (C) GDN are displayed. (Inset) The same plots in
semi-logarithmic scales are displayed. Results for both the GSN and
GDN were obtained from 10
3 different randomized networks. Error bars
represent the standard deviations over these samples.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g009
Figure 10. Comparison of crisis spreading in different network
structures. (A) Changes in the avalanche size for each country in the
GSN with respect to that of the GMN. The avalanche size increased for
the United States, Germany, Japan, China, and France, and decreased
for other countries. (B) Comparison of typical nonzero avalanche sizes
(dark gray) and the likelihoods of an avalanche (light gray) for the GMN,
GSN, and GDN. Results for both the GSN and GDN were obtained from
10
3 different randomized networks. Error bars represent the standard
deviations over these samples.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g010
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systemic investigations of global economic problems.
Discussion
We have studied the crisis spreading dynamics on global
economic system using a simple toy model of crisis spreading on
top of the global macroeconomic network built from the
international trade data. Focusing on the role of the network
topology at the local and global level, we have shown that the
impact of a country to the spread of crisis is not fully captured by
its simple macroeconomic index such as GDP, but its connectivity
profile is also instrumental for a better understanding. Beyond the
direct impact, the indirect impacts propagating through weak links
form a significant part of the avalanche process of crisis spreading.
At the local or regional scale, we have shown that the strong
regional blocs leading to clustering of weak links can aggravate the
crisis spreading, by accumulating impact through the dense
multilateral connectivity within the blocs. At the same time, on
the global scale, the current structure of global macroeconomic
network harbors higher tolerance to extreme crises than the more
‘‘globalized’’ network structures obtained by randomized global
networks. These results may have an interesting implication on the
hidden cost of the ongoing globalization movement: In a more
globalized macroeconomic network in which the regional and
continental clustering continues to become untangled via estab-
Figure 11. Results of the modified crisis spreading model with CAB. Displayed are (A) the cumulative counts of avalanche sizes, (B) the
avalanche profile of countries with the ten largest avalanche sizes, and (C) the avalanche network of the modified model. One may note that similarity
of the overall results to those of the original model (Figs. 2, 6, and 8B, respectively), despite some quantitative changes in the numeric values. In the
modified model, we recover the power-law-like P(A)a tf/t<7; the indirect avalanches constitute the dominant part of the avalanche profiles; and the
avalanche network maintains the continental clustering pattern.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018443.g011
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would propagate throughout the world economy more easily, and
therefore the global economy would become more susceptible to
extreme crises and potentially an unprecedented level of world-
wide depression.
It is now widely accepted that a systems or a network view is
essential for a better understanding of global economic challenges
[46,47]. The increasing availability of various data at the global
scale, and tools and insights from network science with which to
analyze them, provide an opportunity to transform this conceptual
necessity into a quantitative possibility. The network dynamics
approach undertaken here has demonstrated utility and promise,
offering a general picture of crisis spreading dynamics at the global
network level and at the individual country level. We hope that
our simple model and analysis trigger the interest of researchers
from diverse disciplines, including international economics and
finance, systems and ecological engineering, and the physical and
mathematical sciences, thereby helping them cooperate to better
understand and improve the global economic system.
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